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Abstract
The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist parties and a number of actors who
question liberal democracy. Many accounts explain this rise with dissatisfied citizens. This
paper asks whether and how institutions that allow citizens to participate in policy making
affect democratic satisfaction both across different representative contexts and between
electoral winners and losers. To answer these questions, we first develop a measure of sub-
national direct democracy and then combine it with extensive survey data to investigate
how direct democracy affects citizens’ evaluations of their democratic system. We show
that direct democracy does not generally make people more satisfied with democracy;
rather, it closes the “satisfaction gap” between the winners and the losers of an election.
In contrast to previous research, we demonstrate that this mechanism holds across different
representative systems.
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed an increased interest in democratic satisfaction. Liberal democ-
racy seemed to be the inevitable outcome of historic processes, including modernization (Lipset,
1959; Fukuyama, 1989). Nevertheless, the past 10 years and the concomitant crystallization
of political forces opposed to liberal democracy highlight that the latter is only one possible
outcome. This awareness raises the questions how citizens evaluate the political system they
live in and how satisfied they are with it (e.g. Norris, 2011; Liberini, Redoano, and Proto,
2017; Esaiasson, Dahlberg, and Kokkonen, 2020). Such questions are even more necessary in
light of populist parties, which have been considered to be “an expression of dissatisfaction
with existing modes of organized elite-mass political intermediation and the desire to abandon
the intermediaries that stand between citizens and rulers” (Kitschelt, 2002, p. 179). This
paper focuses on institutions that allow for greater citizen involvement and asks whether such
institutions may affect individual satisfaction with democracy.
Direct democratic institutions deserve special attention because they appear to bridge
the gap between (perhaps) naive ideals of individual engagement with the res publica and a
representative system. This is not a new phenomenon; rather, it can be traced back to the
early days of representative democracy. After the French Revolution the assémble nationale
had to draft a constitution. One faction, the Girondist whom Condorcet belonged to, proposed
a draft that introduced a number of direct democratic elements. It was ultimately rejected
(Kölz, 2004). Ever since, direct democracy has been proposed as a remedy to representative
democracy’s perceived deficiencies. Whether direct democracy succeeds in overcoming the
latter or produces any negative externalities are questions for further empirical research.
This interest is reflected both in public discourse1 and in academic research(Freitag and
Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Frey, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Ger-
ber, 1999; Heidbreder et al., 2019; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016; Matsusaka, 2005, 2010;
Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012; Stutzer and Frey, 2003; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Smith
1Nathan Heller‚ÄôsPolitics without Politicians in The New Yorker (19.2.2020, https:
//www.newyorker.com/news/the-future-of-democracy/politics-without-politicians, Torbiörn
Kjell‚Äôs Politics without Politicians in Svenska Dagsblatt (25.2.2017, https://www.svd.se/
schweiz-modell-bor-ses-som-ett-foredome/om/debatt), or Heribert Prantl‚Äôs Alle Macht dem Par-
lament - und den Bürgern! in Süddeutsche Zeitung (28.1.2018, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/
prantls-blick-alle-macht-dem-parlament-und-den-buergern-1.3844015).
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and Tolbert, 2004; Webb, Scarrow, and Poguntke, 2019). Hug (2009) explicitly called for the
study of how direct democratic institutions interact with elements of the representative sys-
tem. At times when democracy is not the only game in town anymore, it is even more relevant
to better understand whether direct democratic institutions affect (dis)satisfaction with the
representative political system and any effects depend on the structure of the representative
system.
Our paper departs from these questions and proceeds to delve into the association between
direct democracy and individual satisfaction using a comparative perspective across 4 countries
and 101 sub-national units. We ask: Is direct democracy related to higher levels of democratic
satisfaction and how does it interact with representative democracy? We specifically focus on
how the winners and losers of elections in different representative contexts react to direct-
democratic institutions. These settings not only vary with respect to their formal electoral
procedures (i.e., majoritarian vs. proportional elections), but also, more broadly, in the way
they address and integrate political minorities (Lijphart, 1999; Bernauer and Vatter, 2012)
We are not the first ones to study direct democracy’s impact on democratic satisfaction.
Most prominently, Frey and Stutzer (Frey and Stutzer, 2010, 2000; Stutzer and Frey, 2003)
and their “happiness hypothesis” have triggered a series of analyses on this relationship. This
literature presents us with mixed empirical results (Altman, 2002; Dorn et al., 2007; Bernauer
and Vatter, 2012; Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012). In the
present study, we go beyond past research in at least three respects.
First, based on a short review of the existing literature, we develop novel arguments about
the interaction between electoral and direct democracy. They focus on the gap in democratic
satisfaction between electoral winners and losers. While other authors have emphasized either
consensual forms of direct democracy (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012) or the role direct democracy
plays in majoritarian electoral systems (Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016), we argue and empirically
show that direct democracy narrows the winner-loser gap regardless of the characteristics of
the electoral system.
Second, we propose a sub-national comparative research design that includes all sub-
national units from the U.S., Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. It enables us to study and
compare both majoritarian and consensual sub-national democracies, which further exhibit
3
varying degrees of direct democracy. Indeed, previous research has so far focused exclusively
on the subnational units of countries with extensively developed DD (i.e., the Swiss cantons or
the US states) which all follow either a consensual or a majoritarian system. While studies have
compared different representative models of democracy, they have incorporated little variation
in direct democracy (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012). We therefore lack a truly comparative view
and this omission has consequences for our scope and opportunity to better understand direct
democratic institutions.2 Our sub-national cross-country approach enables us to take Hug’s
claim that we should try to better understand how direct democratic institutions interact with
other elements of representative democracy seriously (Hug, 2009).
Finally, we build on work by Altman (2017) to propose and provide a measure of direct
democratic institutions for 101 sub-national units across four countries. We refer to direct
democracy as a set of institutions that allow citizens to challenge a government’s decision. It
is an institutionalized process by which citizens collect (enough) signatures and force a ballot
vote, or where the constitution demands a mandatory ballot vote. This ballot decision can
take the form of an initiative, when citizens propose a new law, or of an optional or mandatory
referendum. This bundle of institutions differs from instances where the government “allows”
people to vote on an issue (Altman, 2017). Depending on how easy the access to these direct
democratic instruments is and how frequently they are used, we conceptualize direct democracy
not only as a binary feature (i.e., whether it is available or not) but also as a matter of degree.
The four countries under investigation – USA, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria – are the
four cases where direct democracy not only exists at the sub-national level but also varies
across units in a relevant way.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present previous research on
the relationships between direct democracy and individual satisfaction with democracy and
representative systems and satisfaction, and formulate a number of empirical expectations.
We then explain our measurement approach, which builds on Altman’s (2017) country-level
index, and show how it compares to existing measures. In the fourth section, we analyze the
association between direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy in 101 sub-national
units across four countries. In particular, we show that the difference in satisfaction with
2See Geissel, Krämling, and Paulus (2019) for a rare example applied to the heterogeneous effects of direct
democracy on inequality.
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democracy between electoral winners and electoral losers is significantly different when direct
democratic institutions are available. In line with our theoretical argument, we show that
extensive direct democratic rights have the potential to fill the satisfaction gap which emerges
between the winners and the losers of elections in representative systems.
2 Theoretical Background
Before presenting our argument, we first discuss two strands of literature: research on how the
nature of the representative system (e.g. majoritarian vs consensus) affects citizens’ satisfac-
tion with democracy and research on how direct democratic institutions can have an impact
on satisfaction with democracy. We then bring these two discussions together and formulate
our argument. The core claim we make builds on Anderson and Guillory’s (1997) finding that
the representative system creates a satisfaction gap between winners and losers of elections.
We argue that direct democratic institutions can narrow this gap. Extensive direct democratic
institutions can close it in a way that winners and losers are equally satisfied with democracy.
2.1 Representative Democracy and Democratic Satisfaction
How does the nature of the representative system affect citizens’ satisfaction with democ-
racy? Anderson and Guillory (1997) show that consensus and majoritarian democracies treat
electoral winners (those who have voted for a political party entering the government) and
electoral losers (those who have voted for a party that is not part of the government) differ-
ently, which influences citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. They find that the gap between
electoral winners’ and losers’ satisfaction with democracy is higher in majoritarian systems
than in consensual democracies (see also Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson and Guillory, 1997;
Bernauer and Vatter, 2012; Martini and Quaranta, 2019; Singh, Karakoç, and Blais, 2012).
In a nutshell, in majoritarian systems, winners tend to be more satisfied while losers are less
satisfied.
Anderson and Guillory (1997) argue that this wider gap results from the nature of rep-
resentative democracy. In particular, institutional settings that provide “electoral losers with
significant rights to participate in governmental decision making” reduce the gap between
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winners and losers (Anderson and Guillory, 1997, p. 68). Their argument focuses on typical
elements of consensual democracies, such as the presence of two chambers, multi-party gov-
ernments, federalism, and decentralization (as characterized by Lijphart (1999)), but they also
refer to referendums.
2.2 Direct Democracy and Democratic Satisfaction
In a series of influential empirical studies on the Swiss cantons, Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2010)
document direct democracy’s positive effect on people’s life satisfaction. The authors find that
people report significantly higher levels of satisfaction if they live in a Swiss canton with easier
access to and more frequent use of direct democratic institutions. While these findings hold in
the US context (Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016), some of them have since been questioned (Dorn
et al., 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012).
The argument that direct democracy affects individual satisfaction seems to be quite the-
oretically compelling, especially if it is applied to satisfaction with democracy - the concept
at the heart of our paper. First, policy outcomes resulting from direct democratic consulta-
tions can be expected to come closer to the median voter’s preferences, therefore leading to
more satisfied citizens. Second, direct democracy should produce positive procedural effects
by creating a perception of procedural fairness.
Several studies corroborate these underlying dynamics, especially those behind the policy
outcomes of direct democracy. In her famous research on the median-voter effect of refer-
endums, Gerber (1996a, 1999) documents that death penalty legislation and abortion rights
indeed come closer to the median voters’ preferences in states with popular initiatives. Simi-
larly, Matsusaka (2004) claims that “Direct Democracy Works” with respect to outcomes, voter
competence, and the principal-agent problem. More recently and relevant to the Swiss con-
text, Leemann and Wasserfallen (2016) show that direct democratic institutions are conducive
to policy congruence, even when no vote takes place. The constant threat of a referendum
constrains legislators to a certain extent. Finally, Olken (2010) shows how participation in
decision making affects satisfaction.
However, previous research also offers arguments that question the generally positive rela-
tionship between direct democracy and democratic satisfaction. One concern emphasizes that
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the mechanisms and, thus, potentially, the outcomes of direct democracy are contingent on
how these participatory instruments are embedded in the political system (Heidbreder et al.,
2019). Therefore, these effects may not materialize just under any circumstances. Rather, we
need to consider that direct democratic institutions interact with other elements of represen-
tative democracy (Hug, 2009). Most important, direct democracy may affect satisfaction in
majoritarian and consensual political systems differently.
A comparison between the US and the Swiss subnational units illustrates this intuition.
Switzerland is a typical example of a consensus democracy (Linder, 2010; Lijphart, 1999);
direct democracy is a crucial and integral part of it. Direct democracy has forced and still
forces political actors to share power, and has played a pivotal role in the emergence of a
multiparty government and a consensual political culture. Even though both the US states
and Switzerland can be considered “the pioneers of modern direct democracy” (Gross and
Kaufmann, 2003, p. 3), the role of the latter is quite different in the US. US direct democratic
rights have not led to powersharing; rather, direct democracy offers a way to “get around” the
legislature (Heidbreder et al., 2019, p. 375). By building a parallel, independent way of policy-
making, direct democracy may exacerbate the problems of representation that are inherent
to majoritarian democracies, and, as a result, negatively affect satisfaction with democracy
(Aarts and Thomasson, 2008).3 Unlike its Swiss counterpart, US direct democracy rarely
involves broader input and discussion on a salient problem; rather, it produces outputs that
are even more conflicting than those originating from the traditional policy-making arena
(Möckli, 1994, p. 111, 352).4 It is thus questionable whether direct democracy increases
democratic satisfaction in political systems like the US states.
3Of course, the popular initiative in Switzerland can also be considered an instrument of getting “around”
the legislature by proposing new laws or articles that the parliament has failed to introduce. However, the
research on Swiss direct democracy broadly accepts that the popular initiative clearly goes beyond “getting
around the legislature” and has at least three more functions, namely 1) to enforce consensual behavior by the
legislature and the government, 2) to bring new issues to the political agenda, and 3) to mobilize the initiator
and potential supporters (Linder, 2010).
4Public opinion data tend to corroborate these differences. In a comparative study, Bowler and Donovan
(2004) find that Switzerland has the highest support for direct democracy among 16 established democracies.
84 percent of Swiss citizens agree, or even strongly agree with the statement in the question “Thinking about
politics in Switzerland, to what extent do you agree or disagree: referendums are a good way to decide important
political questions?” (Bowler and Donovan, 2004, 352). By contrast, only 64 percent of US citizens agreed or
strongly agreed with it. According to Smith, Tolbert, and Keller (2010, 513), even fewer citizens are in favor of
a national referendum. See also Anderson and Goodyear-Grant (2010) for more insights on preferences towards
direct democratic institutions.
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2.3 Direct and Representative Institutions and How They Affect Satisfac-
tion with Democracy
We are not the first to look at the intersection of representative and direct democracy with
a focus on how it affects citizens’ satisfaction. Bernauer and Vatter (2012) claim that when
it is combined with large governments, direct democracy is another consensual aspect that
decreases losers’ deprivation and limits winners’ satisfaction. They consider these two el-
ements – consensual decision making (or power sharing) and direct democracy – forms of
horizontal power sharing. We take a different point of view here. Their analysis of 24 coun-
tries is limited to the specific situation where direct democracy is embedded in a context of
consensual democracy. Obviously, this is the result of empirical limitations: being the only
country with substantial direct democracy at the national level, Switzerland is an outlier on
the cabinets-direct-democracy dimension. The authors acknowledge that only in Switzerland
can one observe a level of consensual direct democracy able to equalize electoral winners’ and
losers’ satisfaction with democracy (ibid. 455). This fact naturally raises some doubts about
whether the aforementioned effect is driven by the Swiss case. Accordingly, the study does
not provide a theoretical argument about how direct democracy could interact with a more
majoritarian model of democracy.
Finally, Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016)’s study suggests that direct democracy may affect
winner-loser differences in majoritarian contexts. Citizens of the U.S. states psychologically or
emotionally benefit from knowing that important matters will be discussed and decided on in
an inclusive fashion rather than in the “confusing, uncertain, and potentially corrupt ’smoke-
filled rooms’ of the legislative process” (Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016, p. 1419). This argument
implies that it may be particularly important to include electoral losers into the benefits of
direct democracy in a majoritarian setting. By extending the analysis beyond one country, we
are able to explore this relationship and show findings pointing in the opposite direction.
2.4 Hypotheses
Building on these strands of literature, we formulate several expectations with respect to the
impact direct democracy has on individual democratic satisfaction in different representative
contexts.
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First, we follow earlier research in assuming that direct democracy has the potential to
generally increase satisfaction with democracy. Previous research has substantial empirical
limits related to the lack of variation in representative contexts and direct democracy alike.
We believe that the inconclusive findings discussed above may result from these empirical
limitations, rather than from the validity of the proposed theoretical mechanisms. Therefore,
our first expectation is that more extensive direct democracy is generally related to higher levels
of democratic satisfaction.
Nevertheless, we also agree that when we study the effects of direct democracy we should
take into account these institutions’ embeddedness in various representative contexts (Hug,
2009) and consider that the effect of direct democracy may be contingent on the representative
context. We therefore test a second hypothesis: The relationship between direct democracy and
satisfaction with democracy varies across representative contexts.
Furthermore, previous research on the winner-loser gap puts forth several different argu-
ments about direct democracy’s capacity to reduce the disparity in democratic satisfaction
between the winners and losers of the electoral system. While Bernauer and Vatter (2012) em-
phasize the equalizing effect of consensual direct democracy (i.e., direct democracy embedded
in a consensual representative setting), which obviously predominates in Switzerland, Radcliff
and Shufeldt (2016) imply that direct democracy may especially accommodate losers in ma-
joritarian systems because direct democracy prevents winners from taking absolutely all. The
two studies do not investigate the independent effect of direct democracy but are theoretically
and empirically grounded in the specific countries they focus on. Nevertheless, based on them,
we assume that the equalizing effect of direct democracy could be rather generic and affect
winner-loser differences in democratic systems across different representative contexts: Direct
democracy reduces the gap in satisfaction with democracy between electoral winners and losers.
3 A Comparative Measure of Sub-National Direct Democracy
The previous sections have discussed the limits cross-national analyses, especially those related
to the lack of variance in direct democracy. The alternative strategy of using country-specific
sub-national analyses is also problematic: Analyzing all Swiss cantons or all US states entails
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working with little variance in representative democracy. All Swiss cantons more or less follow
the ideal of a consensual democracy, with proportional electoral systems, oversized executives,
etc. (Vatter, 2002). American states are all majoritarian political systems. Hence, the most
promising way of approaching the interaction between direct democracy and representative
democracy is to analyze sub-national entities (which either have or do not have direct democ-
racy provisions) across different countries. This strategy enables us to analyze variance in
both direct democracy and representative democracy.
Nevertheless, measuring direct democracy (at the sub-national level) is not intuitive (see
e.g. Matsusaka, 2000; Stutzer, 1999; Leemann, 2019). Very different measurement approaches
have been used in the US and the European (mostly Swiss) context, for example. To date,
there is no comparable comparative data or indicator for sub-national direct democracy. In
an effort to fill this gap, we propose a measure of direct democracy for sub-national units that
allows us to ascertain the dimensions of such institutions across various country contexts. This
index directly builds on Altman (2017) and his Direct Democracy Practice Potential, but has
been adapted for our purposes. While we relegate the technical discussion of the index to the
appendix (see subsection A1.3), we describe the concept and how it departs from previous
contributions in this section. We then discuss how the index is constructed. In a final step,
we show how sub-national entities in the US, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria compare to
one another in the extent of direct democracy they offer their citizenry.
3.1 Direct Democracy - A Concept
We conceptualize direct democracy as a set of institutions that allow citizens to challenge a
government’s decision. It is an institutionalized process by which citizens collect (enough)
signatures and force a ballot vote, or where the constitution demands a mandatory ballot
vote. The outcome of the vote is binding. We choose this narrow definition on purpose, since
using a broader concept would run the risk of conflating fundamentally different aspects. We
seek to capture the non-representative avenue by which citizens can change or affect policy
decisions (see e.g. Cheneval and el-Wakil, 2018). This deviates from Altman (2011)’s definition
of direct democracy, for example, which also covers plebiscites, and, more generally, ballot
votes initiated by the government. In fact, it comes closer to what Altman labels bottom-up
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direct democracy, except we also include mandatory referendums. Doing so is important if we
want to account for the indirect way direct democratic institutions can affect policy outcomes.
Policymakers aware of or expecting a referendum vote down the road will anticipate it and
not implement their preferred policy but, rather, the best policy capable of surviving the vote
(e.g Neidhart, 1970; Gerber, 1996b; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001; Hug, 2004; Leemann and
Wasserfallen, 2016).5
While the empirical evidence that this is the case in the US is mixed (Lascher, Hagen, and
Rochlin, 1996; Gerber, 1996a), it is quite clear in the context of the Swiss cantons (Leemann
and Wasserfallen, 2016). Indeed, this policymakers’ behavior is a core characteristic of our
concept of direct democracy.6 It is also in line with many formal theoretical treatments on the
subject where the policy-setter (legislature or government) does not implement its ideal point
but rather its best policy that just fails to provoke a referendum (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal,
1978; Hug, 2004; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016). The core
idea is that the representative system produces different outcomes when every governmental
decision can potentially be challenged at the ballot box.
As a result, this understanding also (mostly) excludes the increasing number of referendums
on EU-related matters in EU member states. In most cases, we argue here, these referendums
are not actually elements of the institutionalized decision-making process and, therefore, in
many respects follow a different logic than direct democracy as conceptualized in this paper
(Heidbreder et al., 2019). Finally, there is a rare institution that straddles the line between
direct and representative democracy: the recall (Kölz, 1996, p. 105). The recall allows citizens
to collect signatures to unseat an elected official. While it falls somewhere between the repre-
sentative and direct part, we eventually exclude it from the final measure as empirically it also
appears to be an independent dimension unrelated to the other elements of direct democracy
(for more details, see Figure 6 and subsection A1.3 in the appendix).
5See also Rappard (1912) for an early argument about anticipation effects. It is noteworthy that his argument
is based on the initiative and who is allowed to participate in the law-making process (p. 138-139).
6The reason why this is relevant lies in its efficiency. No citizenry can vote on all matters but
the constant threat of the ballot box can still exert an influence without one single voter having
to collect signatures or to actually vote. This might be the truly fascinating part. For a more
detailed version of the argument, see this blog post: http://www.democraticaudit.com/2016/06/22/
is-direct-democracy-effective-yes-if-it-is-citizens-who-start-the-process/.
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3.2 Measuring Sub-National Direct Democracy
The sub-national direct democracy index (snDDI) is based on a number of different institutions
and indicators. Here, we present a measure that is based on the optional referendum and the
initiative. We want to measure how easily citizens can use each of these two institutions to
force the legislative or executive to change policy and whether they are actually used.
To measure the strength of each component we follow the proposed indicators of Altman
(2017)’s cross-national direct democracy measure, with some exceptions (see later). We rely on
the number of signatures that have to be collected (signature), the time provided to collect
the required signatures (time), the presence (or absence) of any participatory requirement to
validate the outcome of the vote (quorum)7, a dummy of whether a ballot vote is required to
pass any extra-majority to be considered successful (extramaj), and finally, a variable that
indicates whether this institution has recently been used (threat), which is supposed to allow
to distinguish cases where the de jure possibility is not used de facto.
3.2.1 Operationalization
The operationalization of time allowed for the collection of signatures (t measured in years)
is
√
t whereas all durations longer than one year are capped at one. A 9-month period to




). This is taken directly from Altman (2017).
Potential quorum (labeled q) is based on the presence or absence of a minimal participation re-
quirement or a combination of participation and support. It is based on Altman (2011)’s status
quo surface and takes the value of 0.5 if there are no restrictions. The extra-majoritarian fac-
tor (em) accommodates double-majority requirements. An example of such a double-majority
is found in national Swiss initiatives where both a majority of the voters and a majority of
the voters in a majority of the cantons need to approve. It is calculated as em = 0.5 + 1−D2
where D measures the share of districts that have to approve. The threat indicator measures
whether the institution also exists de facto and any use of it over the last five years leads to
its maximum value. After that, the score continuously declines by 0.06 per year – if the last
7For example, national referendums in Italy have a quorum of 50% and one frequent strategy (used by the
group supporting the bill that would be toppled in the referendum ballot) is to fail to participate in order to
reduce participation so that the outcome is not valid (Uleri, 2002).
12
use of the institution took place 22 or more years ago, the value is 0.
The one clear deviation from Altman’s approach has to do with the operationalization of
the signature threshold. This component is high when few signatures are needed and is low
when many signatures are needed. We measure how low the signature threshold is and rely on
a quickly declining function in the number of required signatures. We measure signature (s∗)
as s = 0.01s%
2
+0.01
. This function is continuous in s% (required share of citizens that have to sign)
but much more sensitive than Altman’s proposed (1−s%).8 In the appendix, we visualize these
differences (see Figure 5). In doing so, our measure is more sensitive to signature thresholds.
This is important as the signature threshold directly translates into how easy or how difficult
it is to employ these direct democratic institutions (see e.g Hug, 2004).
With these exceptions, we closely follow Altman (2015)’s general approach and apply it to
sub-national units. We sum up the different elements that go into the final measure in Table 1.
The table shows how the index is constructed across different institutions. Each institution’s
score ranges between 0 and 1 and we take the average value across all three institutions to
generate an overall measure of sub-national Direct Democracy:
Table 1: Details of the snDDI
Institution Openness Effectiveness Threat
Optional referendum (OR) IOR ⋅ s
∗
OR ⋅ tOR eM,OR IT,OR
Mandatory referendum (MR) IMR eM,MR
Initiative (PI) IPI ⋅ s
∗
PI ⋅ tPI eM,PI IT,PI




t⋅: time to collect signatures, em,⋅: extra-majoritarian factor.
The next section provides a brief descriptive account of the generated measures in the US,
Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
8One difficulty in collecting data is that the signature threshold is defined in different ways. In Swiss cantons
and German Länder it is usually formulated as the share of citizens eligible to vote. In the US, it is usually
formulated as the share of people participating in the last gubernatorial elections. We translate the US rules
into a comparable measure by taking vote turn-out into account.
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3.2.2 Comparing Direct Democracy in Sub-National Units
Figure 1 displays our indicator’s values for each US, German, Austrian, and Swiss sub-national
unit. It is important to note that the index registers considerable variance in the degree of
direct democracy, not only across but also within countries.
Figure 1: Comparison of snDDI
In Austria, most citizens do not have access to direct democracy; the exception are those
living in Vorarlberg and Salzburg. In Germany, most Länder are familiar with direct demo-
cratic instruments, albeit of moderate strength. The US is an interesting case. About half
of the states have DDIs but even the remaining states (with the exception of Delaware) score
above zero because they require a mandatory referendum for changes in the state constitution.
Finally, Swiss cantons have extensive DDIs, comparable to the top-ranking half of the states
in the US.
The validation of this measure is not straight-forward. However, the Swiss cantons have
their own continuous measure and one can compare the two to check if there is a strong com-
monality. We provide such a comparison in the appendix, demonstrating that the correlation
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between the two measures is very high (see subsection A1.2). This is important because it
also suggests that our measure is capable of capturing relevant variance within the subgroup
of sub-national units with a high degree of direct democracy. We also provide a full table with
sub-national units’ individual values of the index (see subsection A1.1).
4 Empirical Tests: Are Direct Democratic Rights Related to
Higher Satisfaction with Democracy?
In this section, we test our hypotheses. For this purpose, we use four surveys carried out in
Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States.9 Each of these surveys asks respondents
how satisfied with democracy they are and provides four answer categories (from ‘very satisfied’
to ‘not satisfied at all’).10 We use this question for our dependent variable.11
At the individual level, our central explanatory variable is whether an individual is an
electoral winner or loser. To create this variable, we first collected data on the composition
all 101 units’ sub-national governments in the year 2016. Considering that governments dif-
fer in their form and electoral procedures, this indicator may thus capture the incumbent’s
party affiliation in presidential systems like the U.S. states, a single-party government like in
the German Bundesland Bayern, or several political parties forming a coalition government
like in most German Bundesländer and particularly in all Austrian and Swiss sub-national
governments. We then generate a binary variable indicating whether a respondent supports a
political party in government (winner) or not (loser).12
9We rely on four large survey data sets: ANES 2016 (US), SELECTS 2015 (CH), AUTNES 2013 (AT), and
GLES 2017 (DE).
10The precise formulations are: Austria: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you, on the whole, with how democ-
racy works in Austria? Very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied?” (Translation);
Germany: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, fairly satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way
democracy works in Germany?”(Translation); Switzerland: “Are you satisfied with the way democracy, on the
whole, works in Switzerland?” (Translation) with response categories “very satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” “not
very satisfied,” “not at all satisfied;” United States: “On the whole, are you [very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not
very satisfied, or not at all satisfied] with the way democracy works in the United States?”
11This survey question is not uncontested. As Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001) demonstrate, the
indicator captures multiple dimensions of political support, including system support, support for authorities,
as well as support for democracy. In particular, it is not specifically targeted at the sub-national level. However,
in our context, this corresponds to a perspective according to which direct democracy is more than a pure
systemic feature quite well, and also involves specific political processes and cultures (Stadelmann-Steffen and
Vatter, 2012).
12In some surveys, we have to use vote choice as an indicator. Since these are national election surveys,
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Moreover, we integrate indicators of gender and age, seven variables for different education
categories, and six employment categories. We have a fairly large data set and hence add all
of these individual factors as binary indicators.
At the context level, we add the sub-national Direct Democracy Index (snDDI) that mea-
sures to what an extent a citizenry can rely on direct democratic procedures. A second factor
that systematically differs across sub-national units is the size of the government majority.
This variable allows us to account for varying degrees of majoritarian and consensual democ-
racies (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999). To operationalize it, we use the sum
of the vote shares of all parties in government. The size of the governing coalition can influ-
ence satisfaction by affecting decisions’ perceived legitimacy (e.g. André and Depauw, 2017;
Arnesen et al., 2019). Later on, we also rely on an alternative measure that operationalizes
horizontal power sharing (Bernauer and Vatter, 2019). We present an overview of all variables
in the appendix (see subsection A1.4).
We estimate hierarchical ordered logit models where individuals i are nested in sub-national
unit j for various model specifications. The underlying latent variable y∗ij cannot be observed





1 (not at all satisfied) if −∞ < y∗ij < τ1
2 (not very satisfied) if τ1 < y∗ij < τ2
3 (fairly satisfied) if τ2 < y∗ij < τ3
4 (very satisfied) if τ3 < y∗ij <∞
We have a number of different model specifications. The following equation defines Model 1
in Table 2. Individual-level variables are grouped into a matrix Xij and the direct democracy
it is possible that the vote for national legislative office does not align with sub-national partisan preference.
Luckily, for Germany we have a direct question of party preferences regardless of elections. We also show that
these results hold, when we exclude sub-national units for which we rely on a vote intention survey question and
which have single member districts and multi-party systems (where strategic voting may occur). Some Swiss
cantons fulfill all three criteria and we exclude them to ensure that this measurement issue does not hamper
our analysis. In the appendix, we show these robustness tests and the results are substantively identical (see
subsubsection A1.5.1)
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index of unit j is captured in DDj :
y∗ij = β0j +Xijβ + βDD ×DDj + εij
β0j = β0 + νj
νj ∼ N(0, σ2ν)
In most models, we also include a fixed-effects specification to account for country difference,
it is indicated in each table. All models are estimated in R relying on the ordinal package
(Christensen, 2018). We start out with general models and then explore potential heteroge-
neous effects.
4.1 Satisfaction with Democracy in General
In a first empirical test we explore whether respondents living in sub-national units with
more extensive direct democratic rights are generally more satisfied with democracy than
respondents living in sub-national units with less extensive direct democratic rights.
Table 2 presents four different models. We find that the threshold parameters τ are well
estimated and clearly separated across all four models. This indicates that the models are
doing a good job in separating the response categories.
Model 1 contains the winner-loser variable, i.e., whether or not a respondent voted for a
government party, and the sub-national Direct Democracy Index, as well as all other individual-
level variables (their estimates are not included). Model 2 adds a context-variable accounting
for the size of the majority. In Model 3, we add country fixed effects. Finally, in Model
4 we interact country indicators with the sub-national Direct Democracy Index to allow for
country-specific effects.
Across all models, electoral winners display a significantly higher satisfaction with democ-
racy than electoral losers. Turning to direct democracy, the picture is less clear. There is a
positive estimate in Model 1 and this relationship remains positive and significant when we
take the size of the majority into account. But once we allow for unobserved country-level fac-
tors – which constrains β̂DD’s identification to within-country variation – there is no indication
that there is a significant relationship between direct democracy and individual satisfaction
17
Table 2: Ordered Logit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Voted for Party Government 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Direct Democracy 0.32∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.56
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.61)
Size of Majority 1.08∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.00
(0.28) (0.30) (0.32)
DD X Indicator AT 0.40
(0.70)
DD X Indicator GE 0.63
(0.65)
DD X Indicator US 0.52
(0.62)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE × × ✓ ✓
τ1 −2.50







ℓℓ -11349.29 -11342.07 -11315.28 -11314.76
NIndividuals 11318 11318 11318 11318
NGroups 101 101 101 101
σ̂2Groups 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.05
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, whether somebody participated in the last
elections, and six employment categories.
with democracy anymore.
Finally, we allow for country-specific relationships between individual satisfaction and sub-
national levels of direct democracy in Model 4. Switzerland is our baseline and the three
interactions show the deviation thereof. We find that in no country is the parameter estimate
significant.13
These first tests fail to provide systematic empirical evidence in favor of the satisfaction hy-
pothesis (see Model 3). Moreover, the estimates do not suggest that the relationship between
direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy systematically varies across different repre-
sentative contexts (see Model 4). One constraint of the models above is that the individual-level
factors have fixed coefficients which cannot vary across countries. Since satisfaction may differ
across, e.g., education groups in dissimilar ways across countries, we potentially mis-specify
13The significance cannot be gleaned from this output as we are lacking the covariance part. The 95% CI
are as follows: AT [−0.90,0.54], GE [−0.40,0.51], and US [−0.23,0.15]. In all countries the confidence interval
contains zero.
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the models. To rule this possibility out, we also run the models separately for each country (see
Table A7 in the appendix). The results are consistent, i.e., the coefficient of our sub-national
Direct Democracy Index is not significant in any model. We also run the same models with a
measure of direct democracy usage rather than institutional provisions. The results presented
in the appendix (see Table A9), are in line with the results presented here.
4.1.1 Winners and Losers When There is Some Direct Democracy
In the next step, we test whether electoral winners’ and losers’ satisfaction with democracy
differ when, in addition to representative government, we also include direct democratic in-
stitutions. Before presenting the estimates, we explore the winner-loser gap descriptively
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Each vertical bar in Figure 2 represents the average difference
in satisfaction with democracy between electoral winners and losers. Positive values indicate
that electoral winners are more satisfied with democracy than electoral losers. The horizontal
lines show the national average gap per sub-national unit and its 68% confidence interval (±
one standard error).
In most polities, electoral losers are less satisfied with democracy than electoral winners.
Three observations are noteworthy. First, the winner-loser gap varies considerably between
the 101 units, both across and within countries. Second, the variance in the winner-loser gap
is very pronounced for the United States, while it is very limited for Switzerland. Third, the
average gap is largest in Austria and the United States. At an individual level, the difference
between electoral winners’ and losers’ satisfaction is about the same as between respondents
that participate in elections and those that abstain.
We now turn to the second set of models where we evaluate how direct democratic in-
stitutions can affect the winner-loser gap. By including an interaction effect between direct
democracy and the winner-loser variable, we allow the winner-loser gap to vary depending on
the extent of direct democracy provided by the sub-national system. Table 3 presents three
different models that all support the argument that direct democracy can help close the gap
between the winners and the losers of the representative system.
We find a consistent negative and statistically significant interaction effect between the
winner-loser gap and the extent of direct democracy afforded to citizens across all models in
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Figure 2: Winner-Loser Gap by sub-national Unit
Note: Positive values indicate that winners are more satisfied with democracy than losers. Horizontal bars show national
averages of the winner-loser gap plus/minus one standard error.
Table 3. Model 5 is the most parsimonious model and only includes whether a respondent is an
electoral winner, the extent of direct democracy in the sub-national unit, and the interaction
of both factors. In Model 6, we further include our proxy for the kind of representative system.
Including this variable does not affect the results. Model 7 also includes an interaction with
the size of the majority in government, which does not produce an effect. The effect of direct
democracy–its potential to close the gap between electoral winners and losers–persists even
after taking the extent of horizontal power sharing into account. In further tests, we also rely
on a measure of horizontal power sharing from Bernauer and Vatter (2019) and find similar
results (see Table A11). Like above, we also replicate these results with our measure of direct
democracy usage rather than the institutional provisions. Table A10 in the appendix presents
almost identical results.
To illustrate the model interaction, we resort to predicted probabilities across the full range
of potential values for direct democracy. The simulated outcomes are shown in Figure 3. We
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Table 3: Ordered Logit Models
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Size of Majority 0.01 0.10
(0.30) (0.35)
Direct Democracy 0.10 0.10 0.09
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Voted for Party Government 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.23)
DD X Voted for Gov −0.30∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Voted for Gov X Size of Majority −0.17
(0.36)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓








ℓℓ -11287.23 -11287.23 -11287.12
NIndividuals 11318 11318 11318
NGroups 101 101 101
σ̂2Groups 0.08 0.08 0.08
σ̂2βWinner 0.08 0.08 0.08
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, whether somebody participated in the last elections,
and six employment categories.
rely on a pseudo-Bayesian approach and generate 1,000 draws from a multivariate normal dis-
tribution where the central moment is the estimated coefficient vector and the second moment
is the variance-covariance matrix. We use these to provide the first and second moments of
the predicted outcomes.
The figure demonstrates that extensive direct democracy is related to relatively lower levels
of electoral winners’ satisfaction. Conversely, the association between direct democracy and
the democratic satisfaction of electoral losers is positive (but not statistically significant). As
the lower panel of Figure 3 illustrates, the difference between electoral winners’ and losers’
democratic satisfaction is statistically significant in sub-national units with no or low levels
of direct democracy. The difference is about the same as that recorded between respondents
participating in the election and respondents not participating in the election.14
However, as sub-national direct democracy increases, the winner-loser gap diminishes and
loses statistical significance. When the sub-national direct democracy index is higher than 1,
14For a more in-depth treatment of participation and satisfaction with democracy, see Kostelka and Blais
(2018).
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Figure 3: Satisfaction with Democracy at Varying Levels of Direct Democracy ( Winners and
Losers)
Note: Upper panel shows the predicted probabilities of being satisfied with democracy. The lower panel shows difference
in satisfaction with democracy for electoral winners and losers. All results are based on simulated predicted probabilities
from posterior vector.
which is the case in all Swiss cantons, 23 US states, the German Bundesland Bayern and in
the Austrian Bundesland Vorarlberg, there is no significant difference between winners and
losers. Overall, these results clearly suggest that direct democracy closes the gap between
the winners and the losers of the electoral system. This mechanisms is not bound to one
particular representative system, as suggested by previous literature (Bernauer and Vatter,
2012; Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016), but seems to be relevant across the majoritarian and
consensual sub-national democracies of Switzerland, the US, Germany, and Austria. In fact,
the interaction effect is also stable if an additional interaction between direct democracy and
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the share of voters represented in government is added as a proxy for the distinction between
consensual and majoritarian democracies. Moreover, the latter is not significant, corroborating
our previous conclusion that the effect of direct democracy does not systematically vary across
different representative systems.
5 Conclusion
This paper departs from the observation that the quantitative literature on direct democracy
is locked within countries. As a consequence, many expectations about what direct democracy
can and cannot do, empirically are built on weak empirical grounds. On the one hand, results
obtained in one specific context tend to be generalized despite the fact that direct democratic
institutions may generate varying mechanisms and outcomes in different representative con-
texts (Heidbreder et al., 2019; Hug, 2009). On the other hand, results are often inconsistent,
possibly due to the fact that they are obtained in different contexts. To break out of these
confinements, we propose a comparative sub-national perspective across national borders in
an effort to analyze whether direct democratic institutions can systematically affect citizens’
satisfaction with democracy (Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2010). For this reason, we develop an
index that allows to measure the strength of the direct democratic rights in sub-national units
in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. To the best of our knowledge, we
present the most encompassing empirical test of the satisfaction hypothesis, including 101 sub-
national units from four countries in which direct democracy – at least de jure – is a relevant
element of the sub-national policy-making process.
A first main conclusion of this analysis is that there is no robust relationship between the
extent of a sub-national unit’s direct democracy and the level of citizens’ satisfaction with
how democracy works. Generally, whereas we can show that substantial differences in both
the degree of direct democracy and democratic satisfaction exist within and across countries,
there is no consistent association between the two phenomena once we control for country fixed
effects.
The second important finding is that a higher degree of direct democracy is related to
a smaller gap in the democratic satisfaction of electoral winners and losers. In contrast to
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previous research, we find this equalizing mechanism to work across different representative
systems, i.e., it is not limited to the specific combination of consensual and direct democracy
(Bernauer and Vatter, 2012) or direct democracy in majoritarian democracies (Radcliff and
Shufeldt, 2016). Moreover, our results suggest that the closing of the gap is the result of the
lower satisfaction of electoral winners rather than the increased satisfaction of the losers.
The findings presented in this study have several implications. Theoretically and empiri-
cally, we add to the chorus of those arguing that direct democracy does not make democracy
automatically better as such (see e.g., Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010; Hainmueller and
Hangartner, 2013; Leemann, 2015). Whereas our cross-country sub-national approach consis-
tently shows that direct democracy does not lead to more democratic satisfaction per se, our
results imply that direct democracy moderates the outcomes of the representative context in
which these instruments are embedded. In particular, we document the interaction between
representative and direct democracy at the individual level, i.e., the varying effects of direct
democracy on electoral winners and losers. However, in this vein, our findings again fail to
provide many reasons for a too optimistic conclusion. In fact, a strong reliance on direct
democratic instruments does not make the losers more satisfied; rather, it seems to prevent
winners from “taking it all.” Direct democratic institutions narrow the gap between losers
and winners by making everybody equally less satisfied. This is a glass half-full half-empty
situation: direct democracy appears to further equality in satisfaction but does so at the cost
of lowering the satisfaction of the electoral winners.
We need to acknowledge that, besides its merits, our design comes at the cost of some
disadvantages. These are mainly related to the fact that we only have four observations on
the country level, which limits our ability to disentangle the effects of sub-national direct
democracy and the national representative system. A path for future research could be to
apply this indicator to even more countries where direct democratic instruments exist at the
sub-national level, as well as to other research questions to further improve our understanding
of how direct democracy in different representative contexts “works.”
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A1.1 Values of the snDDI
Country Unit snDDI Country Unit snDDI
CH Zurich 1.70 US Montana 1.82
CH Zug 1.79 US Nebraska 1.82
CH Valais 1.82 US Nevada 1.98
CH Vaud 1.65 US New Hampshire 0.67
CH Uri 1.82 US New Jersey 0.67
CH Ticino 1.58 US New Mexico 0.67
CH Thurgovia 1.73 US New York 0.67
CH Schwyz 1.79 US North Carolina 0.67
CH Soleure 1.83 US North Dakota 1.83
CH Schaffhausen 1.82 US Ohio 1.82
CH St Gall 1.65 US Oklahoma 1.16
CH Neuchatel 1.72 US Oregon 1.82
CH Lucerne 1.79 US Pennsylvania 0.67
CH Jura 1.78 US Rhode Island 0.67
CH Grisons 1.82 US South Carolina 0.67
CH Geneva 1.63 US South Dakota 1.82
CH Fribourg 1.60 US Tennessee 0.67
CH Basel-City 1.77 US Texas 0.67
CH Basel-Country 1.79 US Utah 1.47
CH Bern 1.73 US Vermont 0.67
CH Argovia 1.83 US Virginia 0.67
CH Obwalden 1.83 US Washington 1.16
CH Nidwalden 1.60 US West Virginia 0.67
CH Appenzell Outer-Rhodes 1.80 US Wisconsin 0.67
CH AppenzellInner-Rhodes 1.76 US Wyoming 1.80
CH Glarus 2.00 DE Baden-Wurttemberg 0.00
US Alabama 0.67 DE Bayern 1.06
US Alaska 1.80 DE Berlin 0.51
US Arizona 1.84 DE Brandenburg 0.56
US Arkansas 1.81 DE Bremen 0.34
US California 1.73 DE Hamburg 0.44
US Colorado 1.79 DE Hessen 0.67
US Connecticut 0.67 DE Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.53
US Delaware 0.00 DE Niedersachsen 0.22
US Florida 1.32 DE Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.00
US Georgia 0.67 DE Rheinland-Pfalz 0.00
US Hawaii 0.67 DE Saarland 0.00
US Idaho 1.79 DE Sachsen 0.20
US Illinois 0.67 DE Sachsen-Anhalt 0.00
US Indiana 0.67 DE Schleswig-Holstein 0.46
US Iowa 0.67 DE Thuringen 0.48
US Kansas 0.67 AT Burgenland 0.00
US Kentucky 0.67 AT Kaernten 0.00
US Louisiana 0.67 AT Niederoesterreich 0.00
US Maine 1.81 AT Oberoesterreich 0.00
US Maryland 1.33 AT Salzburg 0.67
US Massachusetts 1.64 AT Steiermark 0.00
US Michigan 1.72 AT Tirol 0.00
US Minnesota 0.67 AT Vorarlberg 0.93
US Mississippi 0.67 AT Wien 0.00
US Missouri 1.33
A1.2 Comparing the sub-national direct democracy index (snDDI) to Ex-
isting Indices
In this section, we briefly compare our new index, the snDDI, with another measure. The
snDDI is the average score a sub-national unit reaches based on its (optional and mandatory)
referendum score and its initiative score.
There is a single widely used measure for the extent of direct democratic rights at the
sub-national level and that is the Stutzer index that covers all Swiss cantons (Stutzer, 1999).
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We can now show how closely (or not) the snDDI is related to the Stutzer index.
Figure 4: Stutzer Index and snDDI for Swiss Cantons














































































The Stutzer index only exists for 24 cantons (rather than all 26) since Stutzer does not code the
cantons that still rely on an annual citizens’ assembly. Figure 4 illustrates the close correlation
between the proposed index and the pre-existing measures of the 24 Swiss cantons (.85). Most
important, despite the fact that the snDDI is conceptualized for cross-country comparisons
including countries and sub-national units with quite limited direct democracy, this new index
is also capable of capturing variance in a context with extensive direct democracy, such as
Switzerland.
A1.3 Details of the sub-national Direct Democracy Index (snDDI)
The sub-national direct democracy index (snDDI) is based on a number of different institutions
and indicators. Here, we present a measure here that is based on the optional and mandatory
referendum and the initiative. We want to measure how easily each of these institutions can
be used by citizens to force the legislative or executive to change policy, and whether they are
actually used.
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To measure the strength of each component we follow – with some exceptions (see later)
– the proposed indicators of Altman (2017)’s cross-national direct democracy measure. We
rely on the signatures that have to be collected (signature), the allowed time for collecting
the required signatures (time), whether there is any participatory requirement to validate the
vote outcome (quorum)15, a measure of whether a ballot vote is required to pass any extra-
majority to be considered successful (extramaj), and finally, a variable that indicates whether
this institution has been used recently (threat) - this is supposed to allow to distinguish cases
where there is the de jure possibility which is not used de facto.
Operationalization
The operationalization of time (t measured in years) is
√
t whereas all durations longer than





). This is taken directly from Altman 2017. The quorum dimension is based
on whether there is any extra-majority requirement. This is based on Altman (2011)’s status
quo surface and takes the value of 0.5 if there are no restrictions. The indicator extramaj
(em), which accommodates double-majority requirements such as the majority of cantons and
votes for national initiatives in Switzerland, is em = 0.5 + 1−D2 whereby D measures the share
of districts that have to approve. The threat indicator measures whether the institution also
exists de facto and any use in the last five years leads to its maximum value. After that, the
score continuously declines by 0.06 per year – if the last use of an institution took place 22 or
more years ago the value is 0. All these measures closely follow Altman 2017 with the minor
deviation of rescaling to ensure that the index ranges between 0 and 1 whereas Altman’s index
ranges between 0 and 2.
There is one clear deviation from Altman’s approach and it has to do with the operational-
ization of the signature threshold. This component should be high when very few signatures
are needed and low when many signatures are needed. We measure how low the signature
threshold is and rely on a quickly declining function for the number of required signatures.
We measure signature (s) as s = 0.01s%
2
+0.01
. This function is continuous in s% (required share
15For national referendums in Italy there is a quorum of 50% and one frequent strategy (of the group
supporting the bill that would be toppled by the referendum ballot) is to abstain from participating in order
to reduce the participation enough so that the outcome is not valid Uleri (2002).
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of citizens that have to sign) but much more sensitive than the (1 − s%) proposed by Altman
(2017).16 Unlike Stutzer (1999), who defines thresholds and assigns these thresholds to values
between 6 (lowest requirements) and 1 (highest requirements), we use a function that is con-
tinuous and is not a step-function. Figure 5 shows how potential signature requirements are
translated into an index according to different coding rules from different indices.
Figure 5: Comparison of how various indices account for the signature threshold
The left y-axis ranges between 0 and 6 range which is the original Stutzer (1999) scale. The
right y-axis is on the 0 to 1 range used by the snDDI. Figure 5 illustrates how the signature
threshold decreases Altman’s index very slowly since the function is (1−s%), i.e., the difference
between 1% and 10% is literally 9% points of the index range. Based on that one could say
that gathering 2% of signatures is half as difficult as gathering 4%. However, as we want to
argue, this does not take into account how prohibitively difficult gathering signatures becomes
16One difficulty in collecting data is that the signature threshold is defined in different ways. In Swiss cantons,
it is usually formulated as a share of all citizens eligible to vote. In the US, it is usually formulated as a share
of people participating in the last gubernatorial election. We translate the US rules into a comparable measure
by taking vote turn-out into account.
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at some point, if even more signatures are required. We side with Stutzer and operationalize a
much quicker decline but do want to retain the continuity of the function (found in Altman’s
index). To this end, we rely on the afore-described function where collecting 1% of all voters’
signatures is half-way between collecting 1 single signature (which is the case in the canton of
Appenzell Innerrhoden where any individual citizen can force a vote) and requiring 4% of all
citizens.
We measure the initiatives and optional referendums value as score = 0.01s%
2
+0.01
⋅ time ⋅ (1 −
quorum) ⋅ extramaj ⋅ threat. While this suffices to generate the snDDI, we also operationalize
the recall (using the same operationalization as for the optional referendum and initiative) and
the mandatory referendum for illustrative purposes. The mandatory referendum is measured
as score = (1 − quorum) ⋅ extramaj. We then add the scores over all institutions and take the
average value which will lie between 0 and 1.
Why the focus on optional referendum, mandatory referendum, and the initiative?
Before proceeding to the operationalization of the different indicators, we discuss the question
of which components should be covered. To that end, we perform a principle components
analysis and enter the scores of the mandatory referendum, the optional referendum, the
initiative, and the recall (another institution that we considered in the first place). The
recall’s index value is calculated in the same way as those of the optional referendum and
the initiative. Figure 6 is a biplot (Gregory and von Winterfeldt, 1996) and shows that three
of the four institutions seem to explain similar variance across all US states and Switzerland
whereas, the recall is picking up on variation unexplained by these other institutions.
Apart from the theoretical reasons outlined earlier in the article, these empirical results
further indicate the somewhat different nature of the recall. The recall is not just another
variation of direct democracy; rather, it seems to be a special form of it that does not co-occur
in a similar way as the other direct democratic variations. Figure 6 also suggests that the
mandatory referendum has a weaker correlation with this underlying dimension than the op-
tional referendum or the initiative. Part of the reason is that the mandatory referendum exists
in all states and cantons that have direct democratic rights and also exists in those states that
do not have additional direct democratic rights, with the single exception of Delaware. There
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also is no variation in that measure, as there are no signature thresholds (or circulation times
for that matter).




Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Satisfaction with Democracy 11,888 2.862 0.706 1.000 4.000
Age 12,481 0.492 0.182 0.150 0.960
Female 12,638 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000
Participated in Last National Election 12,609 0.727 0.446 0.000 1.000
Direct Democracy Index 12,690 1.141 0.657 0.000 2.000
Past DD Usage 12,690 2.803 3.202 0.000 11.400
Size of Majority 12,690 0.643 0.154 0.154 0.967
Voted for Party in Government 12,690 0.368 0.482 0 1
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A1.5 Robustness Section
A1.5.1 Excluding Single-Member Districts
The variable “winner” is coded based on the responses of the individual survey takers. In
Switzerland, we have to rely on a survey question about whom the respondent voted for rather
than on a general partisan ID question. Since some cantons are single-member districts, this
raises two problems: i) strategic voting may produce measurement error and ii) respondents’
responses may not reflect their preference since their preferred party does not run a candidate.
In the rest of the countries, we either have a different survey question (tapping directly into
partisan preference) or respondents live in PR multi-member districts.
To ensure that our estimation results are not affected by this measurement issue, we re-
estimate the first seven models and drop any Swiss canton that constitutes a single-member
district in the national legislative elections.
Table A5: Replication of Table 2 without Single-Member Districts
Model 1-r Model 2-r Model 3-r Model 4-r
Voted for Party Government 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Direct Democracy 0.27∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.97
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.80)
Size of Majority 1.11∗∗∗ 0.18 0.14
(0.29) (0.32) (0.35)
DDI X Indicator AT 0.87
(0.88)
DDI X Indicator GE 1.04
(0.83)
DDI X Indicator US 0.93
(0.81)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE × × ✓ ✓
τ1 −2.51
∗∗∗ −1.92∗∗∗ −3.40∗∗∗ −5.03∗∗∗
τ2 −0.49
∗∗ 0.11 −1.37∗∗∗ −3.00∗
τ3 2.60
∗∗∗ 3.20∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 0.09
ℓℓ -11009.16 -11002.10 -10979.32 -10978.48
NIndividuals 10913 10913 10913 10913
NGroups 95 95 95 95
σ̂2Groups 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.05
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, and six employment categories.
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Table A6: Replication of Table 3 without Single-Member Districts
Model 5-r Model 6-r Model 7-r
Size of Majority 0.12 0.17
(0.32) (0.37)
Direct Democracy 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Voted for Party Government 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.24)
DD X Voted for Gov −0.27∗∗ −0.27∗∗ −0.27∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Voted for Gov X Size of Majority −0.09
(0.37)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓







ℓℓ -10952.12 -10952.05 -10952.02
NIndividuals 10913 10913 10913
NGroups 95 95 95
σ̂2Groups 0.09 0.09 0.09
σ̂2βWinner 0.09 0.09 0.09
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, and six employment categories.
Both Table A5 and Table A6 present results that are substantively identical to the ones
in the main tables presented in the manuscript (Table 2 and Table 3). We can rule out the
possibility that our measures can be error-prone for some observations and show that our main




Table A7: Additional Analysis - Country-Specific Models
Model CH Model AT Model DE Model US
Direct Democracy −0.59 −0.14 0.06 −0.04
(0.47) (0.27) (0.37) (0.09)
Voted for Party Government 0.13 0.71∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE . . . .
τ1 −5.35∗∗∗ −1.81∗ −3.07∗∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗
τ2 −2.95∗∗∗ −0.16 −1.03∗ 0.15
τ3 0.27 2.42
∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗
ℓℓ -4520.40 -1125.44 -1969.39 -3573.89
NIndividuals 4908 977 2001 3432
NGroups 26 9 16 50
σ2Groups 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.03
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A8: Additional Analysis - Country-Specific Models with an Interaction
Model CH Model AT Model DE Model US
Voted for Party Government −1.47 0.68∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.49
(1.37) (0.17) (0.16) (0.25)
Direct Democracy −1.01 −0.29 0.04 −0.03
(0.71) (0.39) (0.43) (0.10)
DD x Voted for Party Government 0.96 0.31 0.11 −0.06
(0.80) (0.55) (0.31) (0.22)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE . . . .
τ1 −6.02∗∗∗ −1.77∗ −3.07∗∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗
τ2 −3.62∗∗ −0.12 −1.03∗ 0.15
τ3 −0.39 2.47∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗
ℓℓ -4515.14 -1124.99 -1968.13 -3570.77
NIndividuals 4908 977 2001 3432
NGroups 26 9 16 50
σ2Groups 0.05 0.02 0.21 0.04
σ2βGroups 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.18
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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A1.5.3 Usage Rather Than Institutional Provision
The results in Table A9 and Table A10 are replications of Table 2 and Table 3. Nevertheless,
here we do not rely on the sub-national Direct Democracy Index but rather on the actual usage
of these instruments. We count the number of votes that took place over the last five years
and use the mean number of direct democratic votes per year. This allows us to see whether
the unearthed relationship is related to the de jure rules or rather to the de facto use of these
institutions.
Table A9: Replication Table 2 with Usage
Model 1-u Model 2-u Model 3-u Model 4-u
Voted for Party Government 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
Direct Democracy Use 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Size of Majority 1.27∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.29) (0.00) (0.30)
DD Use X Indicator GE 0.57
(0.46)
DD Use X Indicator US −0.07∗
(0.03)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE × × ✓ ✓
τ1 −2.71
∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗ −3.63∗∗∗ −3.38∗∗∗
τ2 −0.68
∗∗∗ 0.05 −1.60∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗
τ3 2.43
∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗
ℓℓ -11354.51 -11345.29 -11315.58 -11312.26
NIndividuals 11318 11318 11318 11318
NGroups 101 101 101 101
σ̂2Groups 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.04
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, and six employment categories.
The interaction between the usage of direct democracy and the US country indicator is sig-
nificant. To see whether this translates into a country-specific effect, we compute the marginal
effect of direct democracy usage in the US. The 95% confidence interval for the marginal effect
[−0.087,0.004] overlaps 0. Hence, there is no significant relationship between the average use
of direct democratic institutions and reported levels of satisfaction with democracy.
In Table A10, we find a significant interaction effect, but note that the effect of direct
democracy for winners is not statistically significant (95% confidence interval is [−0.070,0.005]).
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Table A10: Replication of Table 3 with Usage
Model 5-u Model 6-u Model 7-u
Size of Majority 0.04 0.19
(0.31) (0.35)
Direct Democracy Use 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Voted for Party Government 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.23)
DD Use X Voted for Gov −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
DD Use X Share of Voters in Gov −0.32
(0.36)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓







ℓℓ -11288.79 -11288.78 -11288.40
NIndividuals 11318 11318 11318
NGroups 101 101 101
σ̂2Groups 0.09 0.09 0.09
σ̂2βWinner 0.09 0.09 0.09
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, and six employment categories.
But even if we are just interested in a potential differential effect, i.e. just the interaction term,
we note that it is substantively much smaller than the interaction term as presented in the
main analyses of the paper - it is about five times smaller. We take this as an indication that
the de jure relationship may not be the only avenue but it definitely is the dominant one.
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A1.6 Alternative Measure for Horizontal Power Sharing
In Table 3 in the main text, models include a variable for the size of the government coalition.
However, the size of the governing majority is likely correlated with the extent of proportional
representation or power sharing in general, so it is not a good measure. It is difficult to find
a good measure that can capture this dimension. Here, we rely on a measure of horizontal
power sharing borrowed from Bernauer and Vatter (2019). Our one caveat is that they do not
have a measure for three Swiss cantons (Bernauer and Vatter, 2019, see p.214). Nevertheless,
here we present a replication of Table 3 based on 98 sub-national units (excluding Glarus and
the two Appenzell due to missingness).
Table A11: Alternative Measure for Horizontal Power Sharing
Model 5-ps Model 6-ps Model 7-ps
Power Sharing −0.19∗ −0.12
(0.09) (0.10)
Direct Democracy −0.08 0.08 0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Voted for Party Government 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
DD X Voted for Gov −0.27∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Voted for Gov X Power Sharing −0.11
(0.06)
Individual-Level variables ✓ ✓ ✓







ℓℓ -11093.11 -11091.22 -11089.64
NIndividuals 11095 11095 11095
NGroups 98 98 98
σ̂2Groups 0.08 0.08 0.08
σ̂2βWinner 0.08 0.06 0.03
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, and six employment categories.
These results are both empirically and substantively identical to the ones presented in the
main part of the manuscript.
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